From: Fiona Ebner <f.ebner@proxmox.com>
To: "Proxmox VE development discussion" <pve-devel@lists.proxmox.com>,
"Fabian Grünbichler" <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
Subject: Re: [pve-devel] [PATCH v2 qemu-server 1/1] disk import: add additional safeguards for imported image files
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2024 10:42:51 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <41efc325-3174-4b26-9a23-9dca1df258e4@proxmox.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241104104221.228730-4-f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
On 04.11.24 11:42 AM, Fabian Grünbichler wrote:
> creating non-raw disk images with arbitrary content is only possible with raw
> access to the storage, but checking for references to external files doesn't
> hurt.
>
> Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
> ---
>
> Notes:
> requires pve-storage change to actually have an effect
>
> v2:
> - re-order code to improve readability
> - extract $path into variable to avoid scalar vs array context issue
>
> PVE/API2/Qemu.pm | 18 +++++++++++++++---
> 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/PVE/API2/Qemu.pm b/PVE/API2/Qemu.pm
> index 848001b6..ae0c39bf 100644
> --- a/PVE/API2/Qemu.pm
> +++ b/PVE/API2/Qemu.pm
> @@ -412,18 +412,29 @@ my sub create_disks : prototype($$$$$$$$$$) {
>
> $needs_creation = $live_import;
>
> - if (PVE::Storage::parse_volume_id($source, 1)) { # PVE-managed volume
> + my ($source_storage, $source_volid) = PVE::Storage::parse_volume_id($source, 1);
> +
> + if ($source_storage) { # PVE-managed volume
> if ($live_import && $ds ne 'efidisk0') {
> my $path = PVE::Storage::path($storecfg, $source)
> or die "failed to get a path for '$source'\n";
> $source = $path;
> - ($size, my $source_format) = PVE::Storage::file_size_info($source);
> + # check potentially untrusted image file!
> + ($size, my $source_format) = PVE::Storage::file_size_info($source, undef, 1);
> +
> die "could not get file size of $source\n" if !$size;
> $live_import_mapping->{$ds} = {
> path => $source,
> format => $source_format,
> };
> } else {
> + # check potentially untrusted image file!
> + my $scfg = PVE::Storage::storage_config($storecfg, $source_storage);
> + if ($scfg->{path}) {
Is there a special reason this is made conditional on the presence of
$scfg->{path}? Note that the above check for live import isn't.
Shouldn't matter much right now (except if there is a weird third-party
plugin that has qcow2 and doesn't use $scfg->{path}), but as long as we
get a result for PVE::Storage::path(), we should be able to call
file_size_info() too, right? Would potentially help detecting other
issues with a source volume early.
> + my $path = PVE::Storage::path($storecfg, $source);
> + PVE::Storage::file_size_info($path, undef, 1);
> + }
> +
> my $dest_info = {
> vmid => $vmid,
> drivename => $ds,
> @@ -441,7 +452,8 @@ my sub create_disks : prototype($$$$$$$$$$) {
> }
> } else {
> $source = PVE::Storage::abs_filesystem_path($storecfg, $source, 1);
> - ($size, my $source_format) = PVE::Storage::file_size_info($source);
> + # check potentially untrusted image file!
> + ($size, my $source_format) = PVE::Storage::file_size_info($source, undef, 1);
> die "could not get file size of $source\n" if !$size;
>
> if ($live_import && $ds ne 'efidisk0') {
_______________________________________________
pve-devel mailing list
pve-devel@lists.proxmox.com
https://lists.proxmox.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/pve-devel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-11-15 9:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-11-04 10:42 [pve-devel] [PATCH v2 storage/guest-common/qemu-server 0/3] harden import of file-based volumes Fabian Grünbichler
2024-11-04 10:42 ` [pve-devel] [PATCH v2 guest-common 1/1] storage tunnel: check just-imported image files Fabian Grünbichler
2024-11-04 10:42 ` [pve-devel] [PATCH v2 storage 1/1] file_size_info: implement untrusted mode Fabian Grünbichler
2024-11-07 12:16 ` Fiona Ebner
2024-11-14 9:33 ` Dominik Csapak
2024-11-14 18:14 ` [pve-devel] applied: " Thomas Lamprecht
2024-11-04 10:42 ` [pve-devel] [PATCH v2 qemu-server 1/1] disk import: add additional safeguards for imported image files Fabian Grünbichler
2024-11-14 9:34 ` Dominik Csapak
2024-11-15 9:42 ` Fiona Ebner [this message]
2024-11-15 9:49 ` Fiona Ebner
2024-11-15 9:55 ` Dominik Csapak
2024-11-15 10:05 ` Fiona Ebner
2024-11-15 10:16 ` Dominik Csapak
2024-11-15 10:15 ` Fiona Ebner
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=41efc325-3174-4b26-9a23-9dca1df258e4@proxmox.com \
--to=f.ebner@proxmox.com \
--cc=f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com \
--cc=pve-devel@lists.proxmox.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox