[pve-devel] [PATCH storage/guest-common/qemu-server 0/3] harden import of file-based volumes

["Fabian Grünbichler" <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>]

this series of patches implements additional hardening when copying
potentially untrusted image files:
- extend file_size_info helper which already does most of the work
- add call to check imported volume in remote migration
- add/adapt calls for `import-from` handling in Qemu

these are not problematic at the moment, and these patches just serve as
additional hardening:
- remote migration requires a special privilege, the source must already
  be trusted
- import-from only allows importing volumes already on the storage,
  which are not untrusted but created by PVE itself, or by a user with
  root privileges

the functionality in PVE::Storage should also be used for future
additions where untrusted image files are processed:
- Dominik's OVA import patch series
- arbitrary disk image upload/download features

where not doing such checks might pose a security risk.

pve-guest-common:

Fabian Grünbichler (1):
  storage tunnel: check just-imported image files

 src/PVE/StorageTunnel.pm | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

pve-storage:

Fabian Grünbichler (1):
  file_size_info: implement untrusted mode

 src/PVE/Storage.pm        |  4 ++--
 src/PVE/Storage/Plugin.pm | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

qemu-server:

Fabian Grünbichler (1):
  disk import: add additional safeguards for imported image files

 PVE/API2/Qemu.pm | 15 ++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

-- 
2.39.2



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