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From: Samuel Rufinatscha <s.rufinatscha@proxmox.com>
To: Christian Ebner <c.ebner@proxmox.com>,
	Proxmox Backup Server development discussion
	<pbs-devel@lists.proxmox.com>
Subject: Re: [pbs-devel] [PATCH proxmox-backup v4 2/4] pbs-config: cache verified API token secrets
Date: Tue, 10 Feb 2026 14:08:56 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <80e69a98-2b61-4d54-895d-c988aa3370fe@proxmox.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1f0a4451-a767-46d2-976d-7c7cef86cd9b@proxmox.com>

On 2/10/26 1:52 PM, Christian Ebner wrote:
> one suggestion below
> 
> On 1/21/26 4:13 PM, Samuel Rufinatscha wrote:
>> Adds an in-memory cache of successfully verified token secrets.
>> Subsequent requests for the same token+secret combination only perform a
>> comparison using openssl::memcmp::eq and avoid re-running the password
>> hash. The cache is updated when a token secret is set and cleared when a
>> token is deleted.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Samuel Rufinatscha <s.rufinatscha@proxmox.com>
>> ---
>> Changes from v3 to v4:
>> * Add gen param to invalidate_cache_state()
>> * Validates the generation bump after obtaining write lock in
>> apply_api_mutation
>> * Pass lock to apply_api_mutation
>> * Remove unnecessary gen check cache_try_secret_matches
>> * Adjusted commit message
>>
>> Changes from v2 to v3:
>> * Replaced process-local cache invalidation (AtomicU64
>> API_MUTATION_GENERATION) with a cross-process shared generation via
>> ConfigVersionCache.
>> * Validate shared generation before/after the constant-time secret
>> compare; only insert into cache if the generation is unchanged.
>> * invalidate_cache_state() on insert if shared generation changed.
>>
>> Changes from v1 to v2:
>> * Replace OnceCell with LazyLock, and std::sync::RwLock with
>> parking_lot::RwLock.
>> * Add API_MUTATION_GENERATION and guard cache inserts
>> to prevent “zombie inserts” across concurrent set/delete.
>> * Refactor cache operations into cache_try_secret_matches,
>> cache_try_insert_secret, and centralize write-side behavior in
>> apply_api_mutation.
>> * Switch fast-path cache access to try_read/try_write (best-effort).
>>
>>   Cargo.toml                     |   1 +
>>   pbs-config/Cargo.toml          |   1 +
>>   pbs-config/src/token_shadow.rs | 160 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>>   3 files changed, 159 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/Cargo.toml b/Cargo.toml
>> index 0da18383..aed66fe3 100644
>> --- a/Cargo.toml
>> +++ b/Cargo.toml
>> @@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ nom = "7"
>>   num-traits = "0.2"
>>   once_cell = "1.3.1"
>>   openssl = "0.10.40"
>> +parking_lot = "0.12"
>>   percent-encoding = "2.1"
>>   pin-project-lite = "0.2"
>>   regex = "1.5.5"
>> diff --git a/pbs-config/Cargo.toml b/pbs-config/Cargo.toml
>> index 74afb3c6..eb81ce00 100644
>> --- a/pbs-config/Cargo.toml
>> +++ b/pbs-config/Cargo.toml
>> @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ libc.workspace = true
>>   nix.workspace = true
>>   once_cell.workspace = true
>>   openssl.workspace = true
>> +parking_lot.workspace = true
>>   regex.workspace = true
>>   serde.workspace = true
>>   serde_json.workspace = true
>> diff --git a/pbs-config/src/token_shadow.rs b/pbs-config/src/ 
>> token_shadow.rs
>> index 640fabbf..d5aa5de2 100644
>> --- a/pbs-config/src/token_shadow.rs
>> +++ b/pbs-config/src/token_shadow.rs
>> @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
>>   use std::collections::HashMap;
>> +use std::sync::LazyLock;
>>   use anyhow::{bail, format_err, Error};
>> +use parking_lot::RwLock;
>>   use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
>>   use serde_json::{from_value, Value};
>> @@ -13,6 +15,18 @@ use crate::{open_backup_lockfile, BackupLockGuard};
>>   const LOCK_FILE: &str = pbs_buildcfg::configdir!("/token.shadow.lock");
>>   const CONF_FILE: &str = pbs_buildcfg::configdir!("/token.shadow");
>> +/// Global in-memory cache for successfully verified API token secrets.
>> +/// The cache stores plain text secrets for token Authids that have 
>> already been
>> +/// verified against the hashed values in `token.shadow`. This allows 
>> for cheap
>> +/// subsequent authentications for the same token+secret combination, 
>> avoiding
>> +/// recomputing the password hash on every request.
>> +static TOKEN_SECRET_CACHE: LazyLock<RwLock<ApiTokenSecretCache>> = 
>> LazyLock::new(|| {
>> +    RwLock::new(ApiTokenSecretCache {
>> +        secrets: HashMap::new(),
>> +        shared_gen: 0,
>> +    })
>> +});
>> +
>>   #[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
>>   #[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
>>   /// ApiToken id / secret pair
>> @@ -54,9 +68,27 @@ pub fn verify_secret(tokenid: &Authid, secret: 
>> &str) -> Result<(), Error> {
>>           bail!("not an API token ID");
>>       }
>> +    // Fast path
>> +    if cache_try_secret_matches(tokenid, secret) {
>> +        return Ok(());
>> +    }
>> +
>> +    // Slow path
>> +    // First, capture the shared generation before doing the hash 
>> verification.
>> +    let gen_before = token_shadow_shared_gen();
>> +
>>       let data = read_file()?;
>>       match data.get(tokenid) {
>> -        Some(hashed_secret) => 
>> proxmox_sys::crypt::verify_crypt_pw(secret, hashed_secret),
>> +        Some(hashed_secret) => {
>> +            proxmox_sys::crypt::verify_crypt_pw(secret, hashed_secret)?;
>> +
>> +            // Try to cache only if nothing changed while verifying 
>> the secret.
>> +            if let Some(gen) = gen_before {
>> +                cache_try_insert_secret(tokenid.clone(), 
>> secret.to_owned(), gen);
>> +            }
>> +
>> +            Ok(())
>> +        }
>>           None => bail!("invalid API token"),
>>       }
>>   }
>> @@ -75,13 +107,15 @@ fn set_secret(tokenid: &Authid, secret: &str) -> 
>> Result<(), Error> {
>>           bail!("not an API token ID");
>>       }
>> -    let _guard = lock_config()?;
>> +    let guard = lock_config()?;
>>       let mut data = read_file()?;
>>       let hashed_secret = proxmox_sys::crypt::encrypt_pw(secret)?;
>>       data.insert(tokenid.clone(), hashed_secret);
>>       write_file(data)?;
>> +    apply_api_mutation(guard, tokenid, Some(secret));
>> +
>>       Ok(())
>>   }
>> @@ -91,11 +125,131 @@ pub fn delete_secret(tokenid: &Authid) -> 
>> Result<(), Error> {
>>           bail!("not an API token ID");
>>       }
>> -    let _guard = lock_config()?;
>> +    let guard = lock_config()?;
>>       let mut data = read_file()?;
>>       data.remove(tokenid);
>>       write_file(data)?;
>> +    apply_api_mutation(guard, tokenid, None);
>> +
>>       Ok(())
>>   }
>> +
>> +struct ApiTokenSecretCache {
>> +    /// Keys are token Authids, values are the corresponding plain 
>> text secrets.
>> +    /// Entries are added after a successful on-disk verification in
>> +    /// `verify_secret` or when a new token secret is generated by
>> +    /// `generate_and_set_secret`. Used to avoid repeated
>> +    /// password-hash computation on subsequent authentications.
>> +    secrets: HashMap<Authid, CachedSecret>,
>> +    /// Shared generation to detect mutations of the underlying 
>> token.shadow file.
>> +    shared_gen: usize,
>> +}
>> +
>> +/// Cached secret.
>> +struct CachedSecret {
>> +    secret: String,
>> +}
>> +
>> +fn cache_try_insert_secret(tokenid: Authid, secret: String, 
>> shared_gen_before: usize) {
>> +    let Some(mut cache) = TOKEN_SECRET_CACHE.try_write() else {
>> +        return;
>> +    };
>> +
>> +    let Some(shared_gen_now) = token_shadow_shared_gen() else {
>> +        return;
>> +    };
>> +
>> +    // If this process missed a generation bump, its cache is stale.
>> +    if cache.shared_gen != shared_gen_now {
>> +        invalidate_cache_state_and_set_gen(&mut cache, shared_gen_now);
>> +    }
>> +
>> +    // If a mutation happened while we were verifying the secret, do 
>> not insert.
>> +    if shared_gen_now == shared_gen_before {
>> +        cache.secrets.insert(tokenid, CachedSecret { secret });
>> +    }
>> +}
>> +
>> +/// Tries to match the given token secret against the cached secret.
>> +///
>> +/// Verifies the generation/version before doing the constant-time
>> +/// comparison to reduce TOCTOU risk. During token rotation or deletion
>> +/// tokens for in-flight requests may still validate against the 
>> previous
>> +/// generation.
>> +fn cache_try_secret_matches(tokenid: &Authid, secret: &str) -> bool {
>> +    let Some(cache) = TOKEN_SECRET_CACHE.try_read() else {
>> +        return false;
>> +    };
>> +    let Some(entry) = cache.secrets.get(tokenid) else {
>> +        return false;
>> +    };
>> +    let Some(current_gen) = token_shadow_shared_gen() else {
>> +        return false;
>> +    };
>> +
>> +    if current_gen == cache.shared_gen {
>> +        return openssl::memcmp::eq(entry.secret.as_bytes(), 
>> secret.as_bytes());
>> +    }
>> +
>> +    false
>> +}
>> +
>> +fn apply_api_mutation(_guard: BackupLockGuard, tokenid: &Authid, 
>> new_secret: Option<&str>) {
>> +    // Signal cache invalidation to other processes (best-effort).
>> +    let bumped_gen = bump_token_shadow_shared_gen();
>> +
>> +    let mut cache = TOKEN_SECRET_CACHE.write();
>> +
>> +    // If we cannot get the current generation, we cannot trust the 
>> cache
>> +    let Some(current_gen) = token_shadow_shared_gen() else {
>> +        invalidate_cache_state_and_set_gen(&mut cache, 0);
>> +        return;
>> +    };
>> +
>> +    // If we cannot bump the shared generation, or if it changed after
>> +    // obtaining the cache write lock, we cannot trust the cache
>> +    if bumped_gen != Some(current_gen) {
>> +        invalidate_cache_state_and_set_gen(&mut cache, current_gen);
>> +        return;
>> +    }
>> +
>> +    // Update to the post-mutation generation.
>> +    cache.shared_gen = current_gen;
>> +
>> +    // Apply the new mutation.
>> +    match new_secret {
>> +        Some(secret) => {
>> +            cache.secrets.insert(
>> +                tokenid.clone(),
>> +                CachedSecret {
>> +                    secret: secret.to_owned(),
>> +                },
>> +            );
>> +        }
>> +        None => {
>> +            cache.secrets.remove(tokenid);
>> +        }
>> +    }
>> +}
>> +
>> +/// Get the current shared generation.
>> +fn token_shadow_shared_gen() -> Option<usize> {
>> +    crate::ConfigVersionCache::new()
>> +        .ok()
>> +        .map(|cvc| cvc.token_shadow_generation())
>> +}
>> +
>> +/// Bump and return the new shared generation.
>> +fn bump_token_shadow_shared_gen() -> Option<usize> {
>> +    crate::ConfigVersionCache::new()
>> +        .ok()
>> +        .map(|cvc| cvc.increase_token_shadow_generation() + 1)
>> +}
>> +
>> +/// Invalidates local cache contents and sets/updates the cached 
>> generation.
>> +fn invalidate_cache_state_and_set_gen(cache: &mut 
>> ApiTokenSecretCache, gen: usize) {
>> +    cache.secrets.clear();
>> +    cache.shared_gen = gen;
>> +}
> 
> above function operates on the chache, so why not make it a method 
> thereof? And also bundle the generation bumps, so they might not be 
> forgotten.

Good catch, makes sense. I’ll adjust!

> 
> Something along the lines of the following diff on top of this patch:
>

Thanks for the code suggestion below, Christian.

> diff --git a/pbs-config/src/token_shadow.rs b/pbs-config/src/ 
> token_shadow.rs
> index d5aa5de28..a8104f142 100644
> --- a/pbs-config/src/token_shadow.rs
> +++ b/pbs-config/src/token_shadow.rs
> @@ -136,6 +136,11 @@ pub fn delete_secret(tokenid: &Authid) -> 
> Result<(), Error> {
>       Ok(())
>   }
> 
> +/// Cached secret.
> +struct CachedSecret {
> +    secret: String,
> +}
> +
>   struct ApiTokenSecretCache {
>       /// Keys are token Authids, values are the corresponding plain 
> text secrets.
>       /// Entries are added after a successful on-disk verification in
> @@ -147,9 +152,22 @@ struct ApiTokenSecretCache {
>       shared_gen: usize,
>   }
> 
> -/// Cached secret.
> -struct CachedSecret {
> -    secret: String,
> +impl ApiTokenSecretCache {
> +    /// Invalidates local cache contents and sets/updates the cached 
> generation.
> +    fn invalidate_state_and_set_gen(&mut self, gen: usize) {
> +        self.secrets.clear();
> +        self.shared_gen = gen;
> +    }
> +
> +    fn insert_and_set_gen(&mut self, tokenid: Authid, secret: 
> CachedSecret, gen: usize) {
> +        self.secrets.insert(tokenid.clone(), secret);
> +        self.shared_gen = gen;
> +    }
> +
> +    fn evict_and_set_gen(&mut self, tokenid: &Authid, gen: usize) {
> +        self.secrets.remove(tokenid);
> +        self.shared_gen = gen;
> +    }
>   }
> 
>   fn cache_try_insert_secret(tokenid: Authid, secret: String, 
> shared_gen_before: usize) {
> @@ -163,12 +181,12 @@ fn cache_try_insert_secret(tokenid: Authid, 
> secret: String, shared_gen_before: u
> 
>       // If this process missed a generation bump, its cache is stale.
>       if cache.shared_gen != shared_gen_now {
> -        invalidate_cache_state_and_set_gen(&mut cache, shared_gen_now);
> +        cache.invalidate_state_and_set_gen(shared_gen_now);
>       }
> 
>       // If a mutation happened while we were verifying the secret, do 
> not insert.
>       if shared_gen_now == shared_gen_before {
> -        cache.secrets.insert(tokenid, CachedSecret { secret });
> +        cache.insert_and_set_gen(tokenid, CachedSecret { secret }, 
> shared_gen_now);
>       }
>   }
> 
> @@ -204,33 +222,24 @@ fn apply_api_mutation(_guard: BackupLockGuard, 
> tokenid: &Authid, new_secret: Opt
> 
>       // If we cannot get the current generation, we cannot trust the cache
>       let Some(current_gen) = token_shadow_shared_gen() else {
> -        invalidate_cache_state_and_set_gen(&mut cache, 0);
> +        cache.invalidate_state_and_set_gen(0);
>           return;
>       };
> 
>       // If we cannot bump the shared generation, or if it changed after
>       // obtaining the cache write lock, we cannot trust the cache
>       if bumped_gen != Some(current_gen) {
> -        invalidate_cache_state_and_set_gen(&mut cache, current_gen);
> +        cache.invalidate_state_and_set_gen(current_gen);
>           return;
>       }
> 
> -    // Update to the post-mutation generation.
> -    cache.shared_gen = current_gen;
> -
>       // Apply the new mutation.
>       match new_secret {
>           Some(secret) => {
> -            cache.secrets.insert(
> -                tokenid.clone(),
> -                CachedSecret {
> -                    secret: secret.to_owned(),
> -                },
> -            );
> -        }
> -        None => {
> -            cache.secrets.remove(tokenid);
> +            let cached_secret = CachedSecret { secret: 
> secret.to_owned() };
> +            cache.insert_and_set_gen(tokenid.clone(), cached_secret, 
> current_gen);
>           }
> +        None => cache.evict_and_set_gen(tokenid, current_gen),
>       }
>   }
> 
> @@ -248,8 +257,3 @@ fn bump_token_shadow_shared_gen() -> Option<usize> {
>           .map(|cvc| cvc.increase_token_shadow_generation() + 1)
>   }
> 
> -/// Invalidates local cache contents and sets/updates the cached 
> generation.
> -fn invalidate_cache_state_and_set_gen(cache: &mut ApiTokenSecretCache, 
> gen: usize) {
> -    cache.secrets.clear();
> -    cache.shared_gen = gen;
> -}
> 





  reply	other threads:[~2026-02-10 13:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-01-21 15:13 [pbs-devel] [PATCH proxmox{-backup, , -datacenter-manager} v4 00/11] token-shadow: reduce api token verification overhead Samuel Rufinatscha
2026-01-21 15:13 ` [pbs-devel] [PATCH proxmox-backup v4 1/4] pbs-config: add token.shadow generation to ConfigVersionCache Samuel Rufinatscha
2026-01-21 15:13 ` [pbs-devel] [PATCH proxmox-backup v4 2/4] pbs-config: cache verified API token secrets Samuel Rufinatscha
2026-02-10 12:54   ` Christian Ebner
2026-02-10 13:08     ` Samuel Rufinatscha [this message]
2026-01-21 15:13 ` [pbs-devel] [PATCH proxmox-backup v4 3/4] pbs-config: invalidate token-secret cache on token.shadow changes Samuel Rufinatscha
2026-01-21 15:14 ` [pbs-devel] [PATCH proxmox-backup v4 4/4] pbs-config: add TTL window to token secret cache Samuel Rufinatscha
2026-02-10 12:58   ` Christian Ebner
2026-02-10 13:18     ` Samuel Rufinatscha
2026-01-21 15:14 ` [pbs-devel] [PATCH proxmox v4 1/4] proxmox-access-control: split AccessControlConfig and add token.shadow gen Samuel Rufinatscha
2026-01-21 15:14 ` [pbs-devel] [PATCH proxmox v4 2/4] proxmox-access-control: cache verified API token secrets Samuel Rufinatscha
2026-02-10 13:38   ` Christian Ebner
2026-02-10 14:07     ` Samuel Rufinatscha
2026-01-21 15:14 ` [pbs-devel] [PATCH proxmox v4 3/4] proxmox-access-control: invalidate token-secret cache on token.shadow changes Samuel Rufinatscha
2026-01-21 15:14 ` [pbs-devel] [PATCH proxmox v4 4/4] proxmox-access-control: add TTL window to token secret cache Samuel Rufinatscha
2026-01-21 15:14 ` [pbs-devel] [PATCH proxmox-datacenter-manager v4 1/3] pdm-config: implement token.shadow generation Samuel Rufinatscha
2026-01-21 15:14 ` [pbs-devel] [PATCH proxmox-datacenter-manager v4 2/3] docs: document API token-cache TTL effects Samuel Rufinatscha
2026-01-21 15:14 ` [pbs-devel] [PATCH proxmox-datacenter-manager v4 3/3] pdm-config: wire user+acl cache generation Samuel Rufinatscha
2026-02-10 14:25 ` [pbs-devel] [PATCH proxmox{-backup, , -datacenter-manager} v4 00/11] token-shadow: reduce api token verification overhead Christian Ebner
2026-02-17 11:14 ` [pbs-devel] superseded: [PATCH proxmox{-backup,,-datacenter-manager} " Samuel Rufinatscha

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