From: Samuel Rufinatscha <s.rufinatscha@proxmox.com>
To: pbs-devel@lists.proxmox.com
Subject: [PATCH proxmox v5 3/4] proxmox-access-control: invalidate token-secret cache on token.shadow changes
Date: Tue, 17 Feb 2026 12:12:24 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260217111229.78661-8-s.rufinatscha@proxmox.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260217111229.78661-1-s.rufinatscha@proxmox.com>
This patch adds manual/direct file change detection by tracking the
mtime and length of token.shadow and clears the in-memory token secret
cache whenever these values change.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Rufinatscha <s.rufinatscha@proxmox.com>
---
Changes from v4 to v5:
* Rebased
Changes from v3 to v4:
* make use of .replace() in refresh_cache_if_file_changed to get
previous state
* Group file stats with ShadowFileInfo
* Return false in refresh_cache_if_file_changed to avoid unnecessary cache
queries
* Adjusted commit message
Changes from v2 to v3:
* Cache now tracks last_checked (epoch seconds).
* Simplified refresh_cache_if_file_changed, removed
FILE_GENERATION logic
* On first load, initializes file metadata and keeps empty cache.
Changes from v1 to v2:
* Add file metadata tracking (file_mtime, file_len) and
FILE_GENERATION.
* Store file_gen in CachedSecret and verify it against the current
FILE_GENERATION to ensure cached entries belong to the current file
state.
* Add shadow_mtime_len() helper and convert refresh to best-effort
(try_write, returns bool).
* Pass a pre-write metadata snapshot into apply_api_mutation and
clear/bump generation if the cache metadata indicates missed external
edits.
proxmox-access-control/src/token_shadow.rs | 123 ++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 119 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/proxmox-access-control/src/token_shadow.rs b/proxmox-access-control/src/token_shadow.rs
index ba5fb3f8..d1b7d4cb 100644
--- a/proxmox-access-control/src/token_shadow.rs
+++ b/proxmox-access-control/src/token_shadow.rs
@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::fs;
+use std::io::ErrorKind;
use std::sync::LazyLock;
+use std::time::SystemTime;
use anyhow::{bail, format_err, Error};
use parking_lot::RwLock;
@@ -7,6 +10,7 @@ use serde_json::{from_value, Value};
use proxmox_auth_api::types::Authid;
use proxmox_product_config::{open_api_lockfile, replace_config, ApiLockGuard};
+use proxmox_time::epoch_i64;
use crate::init::access_conf;
use crate::init::impl_feature::{token_shadow, token_shadow_lock};
@@ -20,6 +24,7 @@ static TOKEN_SECRET_CACHE: LazyLock<RwLock<ApiTokenSecretCache>> = LazyLock::new
RwLock::new(ApiTokenSecretCache {
secrets: HashMap::new(),
shared_gen: 0,
+ shadow: None,
})
});
@@ -45,6 +50,56 @@ fn write_file(data: HashMap<Authid, String>) -> Result<(), Error> {
replace_config(token_shadow(), &json)
}
+/// Refreshes the in-memory cache if the on-disk token.shadow file changed.
+/// Returns true if the cache is valid to use, false if not.
+fn refresh_cache_if_file_changed() -> bool {
+ let now = epoch_i64();
+
+ // Best-effort refresh under write lock.
+ let Some(mut cache) = TOKEN_SECRET_CACHE.try_write() else {
+ return false;
+ };
+
+ let Some(shared_gen_now) = token_shadow_shared_gen() else {
+ return false;
+ };
+
+ // If another process bumped the generation, we don't know what changed -> clear cache
+ if cache.shared_gen != shared_gen_now {
+ cache.reset_and_set_gen(shared_gen_now);
+ }
+
+ // Stat the file to detect manual edits.
+ let Ok((new_mtime, new_len)) = shadow_mtime_len() else {
+ return false;
+ };
+
+ // If the file didn't change, only update last_checked
+ if let Some(shadow) = cache.shadow.as_mut() {
+ if shadow.mtime == new_mtime && shadow.len == new_len {
+ shadow.last_checked = now;
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ cache.secrets.clear();
+
+ let prev = cache.shadow.replace(ShadowFileInfo {
+ mtime: new_mtime,
+ len: new_len,
+ last_checked: now,
+ });
+
+ if prev.is_some() {
+ // Best-effort propagation to other processes if a change was detected
+ if let Some(shared_gen_new) = bump_token_shadow_shared_gen() {
+ cache.shared_gen = shared_gen_new;
+ }
+ }
+
+ false
+}
+
/// Verifies that an entry for given tokenid / API token secret exists
pub fn verify_secret(tokenid: &Authid, secret: &str) -> Result<(), Error> {
if !tokenid.is_token() {
@@ -52,7 +107,7 @@ pub fn verify_secret(tokenid: &Authid, secret: &str) -> Result<(), Error> {
}
// Fast path
- if cache_try_secret_matches(tokenid, secret) {
+ if refresh_cache_if_file_changed() && cache_try_secret_matches(tokenid, secret) {
return Ok(());
}
@@ -84,12 +139,15 @@ pub fn set_secret(tokenid: &Authid, secret: &str) -> Result<(), Error> {
let guard = lock_config()?;
+ // Capture state before we write to detect external edits.
+ let pre_meta = shadow_mtime_len().unwrap_or((None, None));
+
let mut data = read_file()?;
let hashed_secret = proxmox_sys::crypt::encrypt_pw(secret)?;
data.insert(tokenid.clone(), hashed_secret);
write_file(data)?;
- apply_api_mutation(guard, tokenid, Some(secret));
+ apply_api_mutation(guard, tokenid, Some(secret), pre_meta);
Ok(())
}
@@ -102,11 +160,14 @@ pub fn delete_secret(tokenid: &Authid) -> Result<(), Error> {
let guard = lock_config()?;
+ // Capture state before we write to detect external edits.
+ let pre_meta = shadow_mtime_len().unwrap_or((None, None));
+
let mut data = read_file()?;
data.remove(tokenid);
write_file(data)?;
- apply_api_mutation(guard, tokenid, None);
+ apply_api_mutation(guard, tokenid, None, pre_meta);
Ok(())
}
@@ -133,6 +194,8 @@ struct ApiTokenSecretCache {
secrets: HashMap<Authid, CachedSecret>,
/// Shared generation to detect mutations of the underlying token.shadow file.
shared_gen: usize,
+ /// Shadow file info to detect changes
+ shadow: Option<ShadowFileInfo>,
}
impl ApiTokenSecretCache {
@@ -140,6 +203,7 @@ impl ApiTokenSecretCache {
fn reset_and_set_gen(&mut self, gen: usize) {
self.secrets.clear();
self.shared_gen = gen;
+ self.shadow = None;
}
/// Caches a secret and sets/updates the cache generation.
@@ -155,6 +219,16 @@ impl ApiTokenSecretCache {
}
}
+/// Shadow file info
+struct ShadowFileInfo {
+ // shadow file mtime to detect changes
+ mtime: Option<SystemTime>,
+ // shadow file length to detect changes
+ len: Option<u64>,
+ // last time the file metadata was checked
+ last_checked: i64,
+}
+
fn cache_try_insert_secret(tokenid: Authid, secret: String, shared_gen_before: usize) {
let Some(mut cache) = TOKEN_SECRET_CACHE.try_write() else {
return;
@@ -199,7 +273,14 @@ fn cache_try_secret_matches(tokenid: &Authid, secret: &str) -> bool {
false
}
-fn apply_api_mutation(_guard: ApiLockGuard, tokenid: &Authid, new_secret: Option<&str>) {
+fn apply_api_mutation(
+ _guard: ApiLockGuard,
+ tokenid: &Authid,
+ new_secret: Option<&str>,
+ pre_write_meta: (Option<SystemTime>, Option<u64>),
+) {
+ let now = epoch_i64();
+
// Signal cache invalidation to other processes (best-effort).
let bumped_gen = bump_token_shadow_shared_gen();
@@ -218,6 +299,16 @@ fn apply_api_mutation(_guard: ApiLockGuard, tokenid: &Authid, new_secret: Option
return;
}
+ // If our cached file metadata does not match the on-disk state before our write,
+ // we likely missed an external/manual edit. We can no longer trust any cached secrets.
+ if cache
+ .shadow
+ .as_ref()
+ .is_some_and(|s| (s.mtime, s.len) != pre_write_meta)
+ {
+ cache.secrets.clear();
+ }
+
// Apply the new mutation.
match new_secret {
Some(secret) => {
@@ -228,6 +319,22 @@ fn apply_api_mutation(_guard: ApiLockGuard, tokenid: &Authid, new_secret: Option
}
None => cache.evict_and_set_gen(tokenid, current_gen),
}
+
+ // Update our view of the file metadata to the post-write state (best-effort).
+ // (If this fails, drop local cache so callers fall back to slow path until refreshed.)
+ match shadow_mtime_len() {
+ Ok((mtime, len)) => {
+ cache.shadow = Some(ShadowFileInfo {
+ mtime,
+ len,
+ last_checked: now,
+ });
+ }
+ Err(_) => {
+ // If we cannot validate state, do not trust cache.
+ cache.reset_and_set_gen(current_gen);
+ }
+ }
}
/// Get the current shared generation.
@@ -242,3 +349,11 @@ fn bump_token_shadow_shared_gen() -> Option<usize> {
.ok()
.map(|prev| prev + 1)
}
+
+fn shadow_mtime_len() -> Result<(Option<SystemTime>, Option<u64>), Error> {
+ match fs::metadata(token_shadow()) {
+ Ok(meta) => Ok((meta.modified().ok(), Some(meta.len()))),
+ Err(e) if e.kind() == ErrorKind::NotFound => Ok((None, None)),
+ Err(e) => Err(e.into()),
+ }
+}
--
2.47.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-02-17 11:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-17 11:12 [PATCH proxmox{-backup,,-datacenter-manager} v5 00/11] token-shadow: reduce api token verification overhead Samuel Rufinatscha
2026-02-17 11:12 ` [PATCH proxmox-backup v5 1/4] pbs-config: add token.shadow generation to ConfigVersionCache Samuel Rufinatscha
2026-02-17 11:12 ` [PATCH proxmox-backup v5 2/4] pbs-config: cache verified API token secrets Samuel Rufinatscha
2026-02-17 11:12 ` [PATCH proxmox-backup v5 3/4] pbs-config: invalidate token-secret cache on token.shadow changes Samuel Rufinatscha
2026-02-17 11:12 ` [PATCH proxmox-backup v5 4/4] pbs-config: add TTL window to token secret cache Samuel Rufinatscha
2026-02-17 11:12 ` [PATCH proxmox v5 1/4] proxmox-access-control: split AccessControlConfig and add token.shadow gen Samuel Rufinatscha
2026-02-17 11:12 ` [PATCH proxmox v5 2/4] proxmox-access-control: cache verified API token secrets Samuel Rufinatscha
2026-02-17 11:12 ` Samuel Rufinatscha [this message]
2026-02-17 11:12 ` [PATCH proxmox v5 4/4] proxmox-access-control: add TTL window to token secret cache Samuel Rufinatscha
2026-02-17 11:12 ` [PATCH proxmox-datacenter-manager v5 1/3] pdm-config: implement token.shadow generation Samuel Rufinatscha
2026-02-17 11:12 ` [PATCH proxmox-datacenter-manager v5 2/3] docs: document API token-cache TTL effects Samuel Rufinatscha
2026-02-17 11:12 ` [PATCH proxmox-datacenter-manager v5 3/3] pdm-config: wire user+acl cache generation Samuel Rufinatscha
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