From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from firstgate.proxmox.com (firstgate.proxmox.com [212.224.123.68]) by lore.proxmox.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7F2171FF13E for ; Fri, 20 Feb 2026 13:20:55 +0100 (CET) Received: from firstgate.proxmox.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by firstgate.proxmox.com (Proxmox) with ESMTP id E362E70E0; Fri, 20 Feb 2026 13:21:46 +0100 (CET) From: Maximiliano Sandoval To: Christian Ebner Subject: Re: [PATCH backup 1/2] fix #7054: client: remove trailing newlines from credentials In-Reply-To: (Christian Ebner's message of "Fri, 20 Feb 2026 13:05:49 +0100") References: <20260220111951.280082-1-m.sandoval@proxmox.com> <20260220111951.280082-2-m.sandoval@proxmox.com> User-Agent: mu4e 1.12.9; emacs 30.1 Date: Fri, 20 Feb 2026 13:21:41 +0100 Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-Bm-Milter-Handled: 55990f41-d878-4baa-be0a-ee34c49e34d2 X-Bm-Transport-Timestamp: 1771590091074 X-SPAM-LEVEL: Spam detection results: 0 AWL 0.085 Adjusted score from AWL reputation of From: address BAYES_00 -1.9 Bayes spam probability is 0 to 1% DMARC_MISSING 0.1 Missing DMARC policy KAM_DMARC_STATUS 0.01 Test Rule for DKIM or SPF Failure with Strict Alignment RCVD_IN_VALIDITY_CERTIFIED_BLOCKED 0.001 ADMINISTRATOR NOTICE: The query to Validity was blocked. See https://knowledge.validity.com/hc/en-us/articles/20961730681243 for more information. RCVD_IN_VALIDITY_RPBL_BLOCKED 0.001 ADMINISTRATOR NOTICE: The query to Validity was blocked. See https://knowledge.validity.com/hc/en-us/articles/20961730681243 for more information. RCVD_IN_VALIDITY_SAFE_BLOCKED 0.001 ADMINISTRATOR NOTICE: The query to Validity was blocked. See https://knowledge.validity.com/hc/en-us/articles/20961730681243 for more information. SPF_HELO_NONE 0.001 SPF: HELO does not publish an SPF Record SPF_PASS -0.001 SPF: sender matches SPF record Message-ID-Hash: SRJLAKDM6U3QBUIY2LP6OJ3FQADWAZVV X-Message-ID-Hash: SRJLAKDM6U3QBUIY2LP6OJ3FQADWAZVV X-MailFrom: m.sandoval@proxmox.com X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; loop; banned-address; emergency; member-moderation; nonmember-moderation; administrivia; implicit-dest; max-recipients; max-size; news-moderation; no-subject; digests; suspicious-header CC: pbs-devel@lists.proxmox.com X-Mailman-Version: 3.3.10 Precedence: list List-Id: Proxmox Backup Server development discussion List-Help: List-Owner: List-Post: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Christian Ebner writes: > no in depth review, but just a quick comment > > On 2/20/26 12:19 PM, Maximiliano Sandoval wrote: >> For repositories and fingerprints we simply strip trailing whitespaces. >> For passwords, we refer to the password regex at proxmox-schema: >> `^[[:^cntrl:]]*$`, we can only strip trailing control characters without >> potentially breaking existing passwords. >> The encryption password is just a blob of bytes handled locally by the >> client, we cannot remove trailing whitespace here without potential >> breakage. Creation of such passwords (via >> proxmox_sys::tty::read_and_verify_password) only verifies valid utf-8 >> and len >= 5. >> In order to prevent an allocation for credentials that do not need to be >> stripped we perform a preemptive check with str::ends_with before >> allocating. >> Signed-off-by: Maximiliano Sandoval >> --- >> pbs-client/src/tools/mod.rs | 11 +++++++++++ >> 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) >> diff --git a/pbs-client/src/tools/mod.rs b/pbs-client/src/tools/mod.rs >> index 7a496d14c..8dc7c2cd5 100644 >> --- a/pbs-client/src/tools/mod.rs >> +++ b/pbs-client/src/tools/mod.rs >> @@ -169,6 +169,17 @@ fn get_secret_impl(env_variable: &str, credential_name: &str) -> Result> Ok(Some(password)) >> } else if let Some(password) = get_credential(credential_name)? { >> String::from_utf8(password) >> + .map(|s| { >> + if matches!(credential_name, CRED_PBS_REPOSITORY | CRED_PBS_FINGERPRINT) >> + && s.ends_with(char::is_whitespace) > > instead of doing the string allocation above and add additional checks to avoid > allocation here and below (1), why not strip before string allocation of > `password` directly? > > You can use str::from_utf8 [0] and only do the full string allocation once > trailing characters are stripped. When the password does not need any trimming, the current method does not allocate since String::from_utf8 does not allocate. Using str::from_utf8 would result in 1 allocation when doing such "final allocation". For reference String::from_utf8 does: pub fn from_utf8(vec: Vec) -> Result { match str::from_utf8(&vec) { Ok(..) => Ok(String { vec }), Err(e) => Err(FromUtf8Error { bytes: vec, error: e }), } } It should be possible to do the trimming before the allocation, but I don't want to touch the get_credential bits at the moment. >> + { >> + s.trim_end().to_string() >> + } else if credential_name == CRED_PBS_PASSWORD && s.ends_with(char::is_control) { > > (1) > >> + s.trim_end_matches(char::is_control).to_string() >> + } else { >> + s >> + } >> + }) >> .map(Option::Some) >> .map_err(|_err| format_err!("credential {credential_name} is not utf8 encoded")) >> } else { > > [0] https://doc.rust-lang.org/std/primitive.str.html#method.from_utf8 -- Maximiliano