From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from firstgate.proxmox.com (firstgate.proxmox.com [212.224.123.68]) by lore.proxmox.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CC6D01FF135 for ; Sun, 19 Apr 2026 23:07:54 +0200 (CEST) Received: from firstgate.proxmox.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by firstgate.proxmox.com (Proxmox) with ESMTP id E4B84173FD; Sun, 19 Apr 2026 23:07:51 +0200 (CEST) From: Thomas Lamprecht To: c.ebner@proxmox.com Subject: Re: [PATCH proxmox-backup v3 18/30] sync: push: add helper for loading known chunks from previous snapshot Date: Sun, 19 Apr 2026 22:41:54 +0200 Message-ID: <20260419210610.3915597-5-t.lamprecht@proxmox.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.47.3 In-Reply-To: <20260414125923.892345-19-c.ebner@proxmox.com> References: <20260419210610.3915597-1-t.lamprecht@proxmox.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Bm-Milter-Handled: 55990f41-d878-4baa-be0a-ee34c49e34d2 X-Bm-Transport-Timestamp: 1776632780616 X-SPAM-LEVEL: Spam detection results: 0 AWL 0.001 Adjusted score from AWL reputation of From: address BAYES_00 -1.9 Bayes spam probability is 0 to 1% DMARC_MISSING 0.1 Missing DMARC policy KAM_DMARC_STATUS 0.01 Test Rule for DKIM or SPF Failure with Strict Alignment RCVD_IN_VALIDITY_CERTIFIED_BLOCKED 0.001 ADMINISTRATOR NOTICE: The query to Validity was blocked. See https://knowledge.validity.com/hc/en-us/articles/20961730681243 for more information. RCVD_IN_VALIDITY_RPBL_BLOCKED 0.001 ADMINISTRATOR NOTICE: The query to Validity was blocked. See https://knowledge.validity.com/hc/en-us/articles/20961730681243 for more information. RCVD_IN_VALIDITY_SAFE_BLOCKED 0.001 ADMINISTRATOR NOTICE: The query to Validity was blocked. See https://knowledge.validity.com/hc/en-us/articles/20961730681243 for more information. SPF_HELO_NONE 0.001 SPF: HELO does not publish an SPF Record SPF_PASS -0.001 SPF: sender matches SPF record Message-ID-Hash: AIIEWNRL6EYJ64J3ELX7LAYHSQWF6AWY X-Message-ID-Hash: AIIEWNRL6EYJ64J3ELX7LAYHSQWF6AWY X-MailFrom: t.lamprecht@proxmox.com X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; loop; banned-address; emergency; member-moderation; nonmember-moderation; administrivia; implicit-dest; max-recipients; max-size; news-moderation; no-subject; digests; suspicious-header CC: pbs-devel@lists.proxmox.com X-Mailman-Version: 3.3.10 Precedence: list List-Id: Proxmox Backup Server development discussion List-Help: List-Owner: List-Post: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Am 14.04.26 um 14:59 schrieb Christian Ebner: > diff --git a/src/server/push.rs b/src/server/push.rs > @@ -808,6 +808,41 @@ pub(crate) async fn push_group( > > +async fn load_previous_snapshot_known_chunks( > + ... > +) { > + if let Some(manifest) = upload_options.previous_manifest.as_ref() { > + if let Some((_id, crypt_config)) = ¶ms.crypt_config { > + if let Ok(Some(fingerprint)) = manifest.fingerprint() { > + if *fingerprint.bytes() == crypt_config.fingerprint() { > + // needs encryption during push, cannot reuse chunks from previous manifest > + return; > + } > + } > + } I think this has an issue when transitioning from unencrypted to encrypted push. The guard returns early only when the previous manifest has a matching fingerprint, but when params.crypt_config is Some and the previous manifest has no fingerprint (was unencrypted), the `if let Ok(Some(...))` doesn't match and we fall through to loading plaintext chunk digests into known_chunks, if I'm not mistaken. In push_index, those plaintext digests won't be in encrypted_mapping (the chunk was never read/encrypted), so the else branch uses the plaintext digest as-is for MergedChunkInfo::Known. The remote target then ends up referencing old unencrypted chunks while the manifest says it's encrypted. Simplest fix might be to just skip known chunk loading entirely when crypt_config is set - the optimization can't really help when we need to re-encrypt anyway, since chunk digests change with encryption.