From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from gate001.proxmox.com (gate001.proxmox.com [45.144.208.40]) by lore.proxmox.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1854D1FF0C0 for ; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 10:40:47 +0100 (CET) Received: from gate001.proxmox.com (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by gate001.proxmox.com (Proxmox) with ESMTP id 7DD0721676; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 10:40:44 +0100 (CET) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 10:40:38 +0100 Message-Id: To: "Thomas Lamprecht" , "Mark Atwood" , Subject: Re: [PATCH cluster v2 1/1] datacenter config: add ticket-signature-hash option X-Mailer: aerc 0.20.0 References: <20261113030646.3533-1-mark@wolfssl.com> <20261113030646.3533-2-mark@wolfssl.com> <2a835c03-2787-48f8-a8e4-60bd05e35107@proxmox.com> In-Reply-To: <2a835c03-2787-48f8-a8e4-60bd05e35107@proxmox.com> From: "Shannon Sterz" X-Bm-Milter-Handled: 55990f41-d878-4baa-be0a-ee34c49e34d2 X-Bm-Transport-Timestamp: 1794994838779 X-SPAM-LEVEL: Spam detection results: 0 AWL 0.564 Adjusted score from AWL reputation of From: address DMARC_MISSING 0.1 Missing DMARC policy KAM_DMARC_STATUS 0.01 Test Rule for DKIM or SPF Failure with Strict Alignment (newer systems) RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED -2.3 Sender listed at https://www.dnswl.org/, medium trust SPF_HELO_NONE 0.001 SPF: HELO does not publish an SPF Record SPF_PASS -0.001 SPF: sender matches SPF record Message-ID-Hash: EII7DDGN2HV4ELANQBD4LOMIP7RYFUGG X-Message-ID-Hash: EII7DDGN2HV4ELANQBD4LOMIP7RYFUGG X-MailFrom: s.sterz@proxmox.com X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; loop; banned-address; emergency; member-moderation; nonmember-moderation; administrivia; implicit-dest; max-recipients; max-size; news-moderation; no-subject; digests; suspicious-header X-Mailman-Version: 3.3.10 Precedence: list List-Id: Proxmox VE development discussion List-Help: List-Owner: List-Post: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: On Wed Nov 18, 2026 at 5:14 AM CET, Thomas Lamprecht wrote: > Am 13.11.26 um 04:34 schrieb Mark Atwood: >> Add a cluster-wide option to select the hash algorithm for the RSA >> signature of newly created authentication tickets, either 'sha1' or >> 'sha256'. It defaults to 'sha1', the algorithm used so far, so nothing >> changes unless it is set explicitly. >> >> This allows running with crypto providers that refuse SHA-1 >> signatures, such as FIPS ones, where creating tickets does not work >> otherwise. Consumers, i.e. pve-access-control, read the option when >> creating tickets. Verification accepts both algorithms independent of >> the option, once the nodes have the changes to PVE::Ticket in >> pve-common. This affects Proxmox Mail Gateway only through that >> module, it does not read this option. >> >> The option applies to the whole cluster, but nodes that do not know >> how to verify SHA-256 reject such tickets. So it must only be set to >> 'sha256' once all nodes have been upgraded, which the description >> states. Enforcing this by checking the node versions is left for >> later, as it needs to know the release that includes the verification >> change. > > Any reason to stick with sha1 here? I mean, I have nothing against that > per se, but as alternative we could also just switch over fully and > then only do sha256 signatures? > > 1. add support for detecting and verifying sha256 now > 2. enable it later (or with a cluster-version guard on pve-manager, > which we can use as leave package to transitively depend on new > enough cluster/access-control/common (or wherever this lifes). > > Then we would not have to harry that option around and all would benefit > from stronger =E2=80=93 albeit the difference being currently practically= not > really relevant =E2=80=93 signature algo. > > I do not want to block your approach here, but it would be a potential > alternative. Hope it is ok to chime in here. This option was probably added on my suggestion [1]. The version guard you suggest is likely a neater solution code wise. The intent was to allow users that require FIPS compliance to switch to SHA-256 sooner than the next major version is released. Using the cluster version guard helper [2] would come with one downside: It als errors when not all nodes are online or the version information is unreadable. In that case we'd probably want to fall back to SHA-1, which for FIPS compliant nodes would mean that they can't log in if a single node goes down. While logging in with TFA is already an issue in an unquorate state, this would arguably be worse for FIPS users. So we'd need to keep using SHA-256 at least until a new node joins with a version that's too old. We could do that with a non-dying variant of the helper that reads the stale info from pmxcfs as usually version numbers only go up. However, nodes with an unknown version would remain an issue. Alternatively we may want to add a fallback to SHA-256 if signing with SHA-1 fails or allow an override similar to this approach. The nice thing about this option is that it only depends on the state of the local node. Even in an unquorate state the cluster config stays readable as pmxcfs switches to read-only mode. [1]: https://lore.proxmox.com/all/DMKS80347XID.3KPXPXVUHQ3ZG@proxmox.com/ [2]: https://git.proxmox.com/?p=3Dpve-cluster.git;a=3Dcommitdiff;h=3D168ac1= 14df