From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from gate001.proxmox.com (gate001.proxmox.com [IPv6:2a0f:8001:1:32::40]) by lore.proxmox.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 379A81FF0C0 for ; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 00:45:04 +0100 (CET) Received: from gate001.proxmox.com (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by gate001.proxmox.com (Proxmox) with ESMTP id 735C0217B4; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 00:43:49 +0100 (CET) From: Thomas Lamprecht To: pve-devel@lists.proxmox.com Subject: [PATCH docs 2/2] local-zfs: update the limitations of native encryption Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 00:42:31 +0100 Message-ID: <20261117234330.801935-9-t.lamprecht@proxmox.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.47.3 In-Reply-To: <20261117234330.801935-1-t.lamprecht@proxmox.com> References: <20261117234330.801935-1-t.lamprecht@proxmox.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Bm-Milter-Handled: 55990f41-d878-4baa-be0a-ee34c49e34d2 X-Bm-Transport-Timestamp: 1794959018710 X-SPAM-LEVEL: Spam detection results: 0 AWL 0.194 Adjusted score from AWL reputation of From: address DMARC_MISSING 0.1 Missing DMARC policy KAM_DMARC_STATUS 0.01 Test Rule for DKIM or SPF Failure with Strict Alignment (newer systems) RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED -2.3 Sender listed at https://www.dnswl.org/, medium trust SPF_HELO_NONE 0.001 SPF: HELO does not publish an SPF Record SPF_PASS -0.001 SPF: sender matches SPF record Message-ID-Hash: AUAQUO6EPPR2URH6W3ZR6XCAO4MIQSOQ X-Message-ID-Hash: AUAQUO6EPPR2URH6W3ZR6XCAO4MIQSOQ X-MailFrom: t.lamprecht@proxmox.com X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; loop; banned-address; emergency; member-moderation; nonmember-moderation; administrivia; implicit-dest; max-recipients; max-size; news-moderation; no-subject; digests; suspicious-header X-Mailman-Version: 3.3.10 Precedence: list List-Id: Proxmox VE development discussion List-Help: List-Owner: List-Post: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Native ZFS encryption was marked experimental, citing two problems. Replicating encrypted datasets was fixed with pve-storage 9.1.3, and the OpenZFS issue about checksum errors with snapshots was closed in May 2025 together with the send corruption it was traced to, fixed in OpenZFS 2.2.8 and 2.3.3. The installer now offers native ZFS encryption for the root pool. So drop the experimental warning and note what stays readable instead. Replace the statement that GRUB cannot boot from such pools with how the installer sets that up, and mention zfs-mount-generator for loading the keys of other encrypted datasets at boot. Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht --- local-zfs.adoc | 23 +++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/local-zfs.adoc b/local-zfs.adoc index 029f628..0577440 100644 --- a/local-zfs.adoc +++ b/local-zfs.adoc @@ -702,11 +702,8 @@ improve performance when sufficient memory exists in a system. Encrypted ZFS Datasets ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -WARNING: Native ZFS encryption in {pve} is experimental. Known limitations and -issues include Replication with encrypted datasets -footnote:[https://bugzilla.proxmox.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2350], -as well as checksum errors when using Snapshots or ZVOLs. -footnote:[https://github.com/openzfs/zfs/issues/11688] +NOTE: Native ZFS encryption leaves the names, properties and space usage of +datasets and snapshots readable. ZFS on Linux version 0.8.0 introduced support for native encryption of datasets. After an upgrade from previous ZFS on Linux versions, the encryption @@ -724,14 +721,16 @@ NAME PROPERTY VALUE SOURCE tank feature@encryption enabled local ---- -WARNING: There is currently no support for booting from pools with encrypted -datasets using GRUB, and only limited support for automatically unlocking -encrypted datasets on boot. Older versions of ZFS without encryption support -will not be able to decrypt stored data. +WARNING: GRUB cannot read encrypted datasets. For +xref:installation_disk_encryption[full-disk encryption], the installer puts the +kernels and initial RAM disks on unencrypted EFI system partitions managed by +xref:sysboot_proxmox_boot_tool[`proxmox-boot-tool`]. Older versions of ZFS +without encryption support will not be able to decrypt stored data. -NOTE: It is recommended to either unlock storage datasets manually after -booting, or to write a custom unit to pass the key material needed for -unlocking on boot to `zfs load-key`. +NOTE: Encrypted storage datasets with their own encryption root have to be +unlocked manually after booting, or configured to load their key at boot, for +example with the `zfs-load-key@` units of `zfs-mount-generator(8)` or a custom +unit that passes the key material to `zfs load-key`. WARNING: Establish and test a backup procedure before enabling encryption of production data. If the associated key material/passphrase/keyfile has been -- 2.47.3